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REFUGEES, EUROPE, CAMPS/STATE OF EXCEPTION:
“INTO THE ZONE”, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL PROCESSING OF MIGRANTS,
REFUGEES, AND ASYLUM-SEEKERS (THEORIES AND
PRACTICE)
Carl Levy*
This article outlines the debate over extraterritorial processing in the European Union
(EU) from the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). It will
briefly outline the historical precedents, the evolution of policy within the EU, and
the role of other models (Australian, American, etc.). This article emphasizes the
contested understandings of how these zones might be manifested in practice. It uses
evidence from the political history and policy-making of the EU to question Giorgio
Agamben’s concept of the state of exception. In fact, the promotion of extraterritorial
zones was not merely sold as necessary, if unfortunate, choices. Likewise, the more
sinister interpretation of these zones as a regression from the Liberal State to the
universe of camps failed accurately to capture what was happening in reality. Firstly,
supranational extraterritorial processing was beyond the constitutional or political
capacity of the EU. Secondly, at times, the unintended consequences might have led to
a liberalization of so-called “Fortress Europe” and caused certain politicians to
become disenchanted precisely because the proposed form of extraterritorial processing
threatened to institute a rigorous form of burden sharing.
1. Introduction
In previous papers and publications, I have examined the extent to which a
liberal democratic asylum and refugee regime, based on adherence to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), has been
undermined in the European Union (EU).1 In an article published in 2005,
* Dr. Carl Levy is a Reader in European Politics in the Department of Politics at Goldsmiths College,
University of London. The author would like to thank Professor Susan Kneebone for her comments and
boundless patience.
1 C. Levy, “European refugee and asylum policy after the Treaty of Amsterdam: The birth of a new regime?”, in
A. Bloch and C. Levy (eds.), Refugees, Citizenship and Social Policy in Europe, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999,
12–50; C. Levy, “The Geneva Convention and the European Union: A fraught relationship”, in J. van Selm,
K. Kamamga, J. Morrison, A. Nadig, S. Spoljar Virinza, and L. van Willigen (eds.), The Refugee Convention at
50: A View from Migration Studies, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2003, 129–44; C. Levy, “The European
Union after 9/11: The demise of a liberal democratic asylum regime?”, Government and Opposition, 40(1),
2005, 26–59.
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I argued that the after-shocks of 9/11 and the effects of the rise of Far Right
parties were still uncertain.2 In 2010, European politicians at the senior level
were still defending the 1951 Refugee Convention in the EU. It served and still
serves as a benchmark of their democratic liberalism.3
This article covers the period from the Tampere Inter-Governmental
Conference (IGC) of 1999 to the Stockholm IGC of 2009 and examines the
discussions and debates on creating extraterritorial processing camps for mi-
grants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. The debate over extraterritorial processing
has witnessed the same struggle between restrictive policy or avoidance strategies,
and the legal and moral imperatives to carry out the obligations of the 1951
Refugee Convention that I observed in my earlier work. In the past decade,
however, this has been filtered through three policy paradigms: the security–
migration nexus, the migration–development nexus, and the asylum–migration
nexus.
The security–migration nexus is associated with the debates over the extent
to which 9/11 had a direct effect on the EU asylum and refugee regime. A direct
effect is now largely discounted by much scholarship, although the debate is still
raging about what type of security discourse and policy affects migration policy
in the EU.4 On the other hand, by 2010, the migration–development5 and
asylum–migration nexuses have become predominant in the rhetoric and
policy of the EU and its Member States.
The issue of extraterritorial processing/zones raises four themes. Space
constraint precludes full discussion in this article. However, I signal them and
2 One of the best recent treatments of the Far Right in Europe is C. Mudde’s Populist Radical Right Parties in
Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
3 N. Steiner, Arguing about Asylum. The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002; L. Schuster, The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany, London,
Frank Cass, 2003; M. Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Responses to Refugees, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2005; C. Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005; C.
Boswell, “Theorizing migration policy: Is there a third way?”, International Migration Review, 41(1), 2007,
75–100.
4 F. Bicchi and M. Martin, “Talking tough or talking together? European security discourses towards the
Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics, 11(2), 2006, 189–207; M. Collyer, “Migrants, migration and the
security paradigm: Constraints and opportunities”, Mediterranean Politics, 11(2), 2006, 255–70; C. Boswell,
“Migration control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the absence of securitization”, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 45(3), 2007, 589–610; R. Dower, “Towards a common EU immigration policy: A securitarization
too far?”, European Integration, 30(1), 2008, 113–30; R. Bermejo, “Migration and security in the EU: Back to
Fortress Europe?”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 5(2), 2009, 207–24; C. Kaunert, “Liberty
versus security? EU asylum policy and the European Commission”, Journal of Contemporary European
Research, 5(2), 2009, 148–70.
5 The migration–development nexus emphasizes the economically beneficial relationship between the EU and
the Global South of circular migration, diaspora networks, remittances, and skill development of returnees to
the Global South (“brain gain”). Refugees and asylum-seekers can be placed within this rubric sociologically
through the concept of mixed flows, but the legal autonomy of the 1951 Refugee Convention can be
compromised as a result. See, D. Styan, “Security of Africans beyond borders: Migration, remittances and
London’s transnational entrepreneurs”, International Affairs, 83(6), 2007, 1171–91; S. Lavenex and R. Kunz,
“The migration-development nexus in EU external relations”, European Integration, 30(3), 2008, 439–57;
M.-H. Chou, “The Migration-Development Nexus, the European Union and circular migration”, Paper
presented at the ISA-ABRI Joint International Meeting Diversity and Inequality in World Politics, Rio de
Janeiro, 22–24 Jul. 2009.
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subsequently address some related aspects. Firstly, there is the historical record:
the mapping of longer trends stretching back to the 1980s or, as Virginie
Guiraudon argues, to the late nineteenth century.6 Thus, one could track a
tradition from Ellis Island to anomalous airport zones or even designated hotel
rooms in the 1990s and 2000s. Or, from the 1990s to the present, this thread
could be traced from the so-called safe areas in the Yugoslav Wars of Succession in
the 1990s7 and the farming out of security to the private sector and away from
borders (airline check of visas, etc.). In short, such a process would reveal the
evolution of a new regime of neo-refoulement.8 Here, the interest of geographers
has been aroused and, thus, the roles of offshore sites of detention, deportation,
screening, and admission have become an object of comparative study.9
Secondly, there is the evolution of a specific policy on extraterritorialization,
which can be traced from the Austrian Presidency paper of 1998, the camps
outside Kosovo during 1999, and the Tampere IGC later that year to the
Thessaloniki IGC (2003), onwards to the effects of the Lisbon Treaty (2009)
and the Stockholm IGC (2009). Although there was a sharpening of tone from
the liberal spirit of Tampere to the more security-conscious Hague programme,10
EU supranational stewardship appeared to be stymied or at least sidelined after
2004–05.11 From 2005 to 2010, the advancement of extraterritorial zones
became bi- or multilateral projects of various constellations of Member States
and partners in the European Neighbourhood or amongst South Saharan African
countries.12 The EU held the ring through a process of supranational
6 V. Guiraudon, “Before the EU border: Remote control of the ‘Huddled Masses’”, in K. Groendijk, E. Guild,
and P. Minderhoud (eds.), In Search of Europe’s Borders, London, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 191–214.
7 J. Hyndman, “Preventive, palliative or punitive? Safe spaces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Sri Lanka”,
Journal of Refugee Studies, 16(2), 2003, 167–85.
8 Neo-refoulementmeans the package of non-entre´e policies (safe third countries, pre-screening, the farming out
of border controls to the private sector, extra-territorialization, etc.) that prevents spontaneous and mass
flows from reaching borders of countries to claim asylum. See J. Hyndman and A. Mountz, “Another brick
in the wall? Neo-Refoulement and the externalization of asylum by Australia and Europe”, Government and
Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 249–69. For the privatization of migration control, see G. Menz, “Outsourcing
migration control: The rise of private actors in the enforcement and design of migration policy”, paper
presented at the European Consortium for Political Research, 5th General Conference, Potsdam, 10–12
Sept. 2009.
9 A. Mountz, “Islands as an enforcement archipelago: Off-Shore migration processing, graduated sovereignty
and borders”, paper presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, 50th Annual
Convention, New York, 15 Feb. 2009.
10 T. Balzacq and S. Carrera, “The Hague Programme: The long road to freedom, security and justice”, in
T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds.), Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot, Ashgate,
2006, 3–32.
11 M. Garlick, “The EU discussion on extraterritorial processing: Solution or conundrum?”, International
Journal of Refugee Law, 18(3), 2006, 629.
12 M.-T. Gil-Bazo, “The practice of Mediterranean states in the context of the European Union’s Justice and
Home Affairs external dimension. The Safe Third Country concept revisited”, International Journal of Refugee
Law, 18(3–4), 2006, 571–604; A. Betts, “Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the region of
origin”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 18(3–4), 2006, 652–76; S. Wolff, “Border management in the
Mediterranean: Internal, external and ethical challenges”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(2), 2008,
253–71; S. Buckel and J. Wissel, “State Project Europe: The transformation of the European border regime and
the production of bare life”, International Political Sociology, 4(1), 2010, 22–49.
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intergovernmentalism,13 namely the use of agencies such as Frontex14 and the more
recent European Asylum Support Organization (EASO),15 the open method of
coordination, and other variations on soft law.16 This approach was used rather
than a formalized communitarian method, which was politically and legally more
difficult to accomplish, especially since there was and still is no compulsory system
of burden sharing amongst Member States. Further, it was not clear to what extent
Member States were responsible under various European and international legal
instruments for the well-being of deterred asylum-seekers or detained migrants
outside the formal borders of the EU.
Thirdly, there is the complex story of policy transfer, policy imitation, and
policy construction to Europe, of the United States’ Caribbean policy of inter-
diction on the high seas and Australia’s Pacific Plan to Europe, the subject of
several in-depth comparative analyses in the past decade.17 Of especial interest is
13 Supranational intergovernmentalism is the structured communitarian behaviour, which Member States have
assimilated in their policy-making as in the case of Frontex that relies entirely on the sovereign assets (border
guards, coast guards or navies) of Member States to carry out the policy. See, S. Puntscher Riekmann,
“Security, freedom and accountability: Europol and Frontex”, in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds.), Security versus
Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, 19–34.
14 S. Leonard, “The creation of FRONTEX and the politics of institutionalization in the EU external borders
policy”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 5(3), 2009, 371–88; A. Neal, “Securitization and risk as
the EU border: The origins of FRONTEX”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 2009, 333–56; J.
Pollak and P. Slominski, “Experimentalist but not accountable governance? The role of Frontex in managing
the EU’s external borders”, West European Politics, 32(5), 2009, 904–24.
15 I. Boccardi, “EU practical co-operation on asylum and the European Asylum Support Agency”, IASFM, 12,
University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 29 Jun. 2009.
16 For an overview of the concept of the soft law concept of the open method of coordination, see A. Caviedes,
Prying Open Fortress Europe: The Turn to Sectoral Labor Migration, Lanham, MD., Lexington Books, 2010.
For an overview of soft law see, A. Betts, “Towards a soft law framework for the protection of vulnerable
irregular migrants”, IASFM, University of Nicosia, 28 Jun. to 2 Jul. 2009.
17 For an overview of the literature, addressed in this paragraph, see G. Noll, J. Fagerlund and F. Liebaut, Study
on the Feasibility of Processing Asylum Claims Outside the EU against the Background of the Common European
Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure, The Danish Centre for Human Rights,
Copenhagen, 2002; G. Noll, “Visions of the exceptional: legal and theoretical issues raised by Transit
Processing Centres and Protection Zones”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 5(3), 2003, 301–41;
A. Betts, “The international relations of the ‘new’ extraterritorial approaches to refugee protection:
Explaining the policy initiatives of the UK government and the UNHCR”, Refuge, 12(1), 2004, 58–70;
S. Lavenex, “EU governance in ‘wider Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 2004, 668–700;
Levy, “The European Union after 9/11”, op. cit. 46–50; K. F. Afeef, “The politics of extraterritorial proces-
sing: Offshore asylum policies in Europe and the Pacific”, RSC Working Paper, No. 36, Oxford, Refugee
Studies Centre, Oct. 2006; S. Debenedetti, “Externalization of European asylum and migration polices”,
2nd Session of the Florence School on Euro-Meditarranean Migration and Development, 15–30 Jun. 2006,
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies; 2006; P. Green, “State crime
beyond borders: Europe and the outsourcing of irregular migration control”, in S. Pickering and L. Weber
(eds.), Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, 149–66; S. Kneebone, C.
McDowel, and G. Morrell, “Mediterranean Solution? Chances of success”, International Review of Refugee
Law, 18(3–4), 2006, 492–508; S. Kneebone, “The Pacific Plan: The provision of ‘effective protection’?”,
International Journal of Refugee Law, 18(3–4), 2006, 696–721; S. Lavenex, “Shifting up and out: The foreign
policy of the European immigration control”, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006, 329–50; S. Kneebone and
S. Pickering, “Australia, Indonesia and the Pacific Plan”, in S. Kneebone and F. Rawlings-Sanaei (eds.), New
Regionalism and Asylum Seekers, New York, Berghahn, 2007, 167–88; T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, “The extra-
territorialization of asylum and the advent of ‘protection lite’”, Dansk Institut for Internationale Studiier
Working Paper no. 2007/2, Copenhagen, 2007; A. Francis, “Bringing protection home: Healing the schism
between international obligations and national safeguards created by extraterritorial processing”,
International Review of Refugee Law, 20(2), 2008, 273–313; A. Geddes, “Migration as foreign policy? The
external dimension of EU action on migration and asylum”, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European
Policy Studies, 2009, 2.
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the identification of individuals and bureaucracies, which transferred models of
extraterritorialization and interdiction into the EU at the very point when the
public liberal face of Europe deplored them. At various times, different Member
States (Austria, Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands,
Germany, and Italy) acted as policy entrepreneurs in formal and informal dis-
cussions surrounding the European Council meetings from 1998 to 2005.
In order to understand this, studies of policy transfer or mimesis are linked
to the growing literature on the formation of migration regimes and the epi-
stemic and normative communities which manage them.18 The use of the
methods advanced in this literature demonstrates that attempts to sell a
full-fledged policy of extraterritorialization were not unilateral and certainly
not very successful. Indeed, its partisans amongst the Member States, the
European Commission and even the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) were schizophrenic, with different players and indeed key
individuals (Otto Schily, for example) revealing a good deal of mental and moral
confusion. On the other hand, from the late 1990s to at least 2003, the UK and
Denmark were consistent supporters of extraterritorial processing. From Jack
Straw to David Blunkett, the UK brought the argument back to the table
even when other players would have preferred to sideline it.19
Meanwhile, the very idea of disavowing the 1951 Refugee Convention was
advanced by the Austrians in 1998 and later by the British. Both attempts were
unsuccessful. When we look back from the vantage point of 2010, the 1951
Convention is now enshrined in EU law and in EU legal space through the
Lisbon Treaty.20 This raises issues about the limits of neo-refoulement in the face
of the realities of global migration on the one hand (the asylum–migration nexus
or mixed flows21), and the self-constructed normative image of the EU, the
embedded liberalism of European political culture, on the other.22 Thus, a
fourth part of this article links up to a much broader discussion of the concepts
18 C. Thorez and F. Channac, “Shaping international migration policy: The role of regional consultative
processes”, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006, 370–87; A. Niemann, “Dynamic and countervailing pres-
sures of visa, asylum and immigration policy treaty revision: Explaining change and stagnation from the
Amsterdam IGC to the IGC if 2003-04”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(3), 2008, 559–91; A. Betts,
Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
2009; A. Balch, Managing Labour Migration in Europe: Ideas, Knowledge and Policy, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 2010.
19 Levy, “The European Union after 9/11”, op. cit. 46–50.
20 By the time negotiations were underway for the failed Constitutional Treaty and the successful Treaty
of Lisbon, the British had already given up pressing this point and no other Member State objected
to enshrining the 1951 Geneva Convention within Community Law. See S. Lavenex, “Towards the con-
stitutionalization of aliens’ rights in the European Union?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 2006,
1292–3.
21 For mixed flows in the context of three overlapping travel, economic and refugee regimes, see A. Betts, “The
refugee regime complex”, in this issue.
22 There is a vast literature on the normative “soft power” of the EU. See J. Checkel, “Norms, institutions and
national identity in contemporary Europe”, International Studies Quarterly, 43, 83–114; I. Manners,
“Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2),
2002, 235–58: I. Manners, “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, 84(1),
2008, 46–60.
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of the state of exception and the camp, and the state of the refugee being physical
embodiment of them.23
In this article, I argue that extraterritorial zones were not merely promoted
as necessary states of exception. Moreover, the more sinister interpretation of
these putative EU zones as the regression of the Liberal State to a universe of
camps, which scared mid-twentieth-century Europe, failed to capture what was
happening in reality. Extraterritorial zones within the proximity of the EU were
linked to equitable burden sharing under the supervision of the UNHCR and,
thus, were rejected by some politicians; as they feared it could lead to a liberal-
ization of “Fortress Europe” policies that had essentially outlawed spontaneous
arrival of refugees at the boundaries of Member States by the early twenty-first
century.
In the remainder of this article, I focus on three aspects of the themes just
enumerated. Firstly, a review of the state of play is necessary. It is generally
assumed that extraterritorialization has the potential to be illiberal, indeed to
be the fulfilment of a policy of neo-refoulement. To what extent, after the Hague
Programme, the dawn of the Stockholm Programme,24 and the ratification of
the Treaty of Lisbon, is the EU’s refugee and asylum policy more or less liberal,
or more or less driven by the needs of security? More practically, a supranational
form of extraterritorialization would require greater communitarization of
policy: what precisely is the nature of the EU refugee and asylum regime in
2010, 13 years after the Treaty of Amsterdam, which launched the drive for a
Common European Asylum System (CEAS)? Does the EU have the wherewithal
to pursue a policy of supranational extraterritorialization, even if it wanted to do
so? Secondly, the fate of extraterritorialization must be linked to the other
methods of dealing with a flow of migrants into the EU, demonstrating that
pragmatic, legal, and ethical pressures have shaped the present regime in a com-
plex fashion. Although it has worrying legal and ethical implications, the present
regime nevertheless is not as straightforward or as stark as the followers of
Giorgio Agamben interpret them. Finally, in my conclusion, I will return to
the Stockholm IGC and the Lisbon Treaty. A major, still largely symbolic effort
by the EU, to promote resettlement programmes outside and inside Europe is
23 The concept of the state of exception and the work of Giorgio Agambem has been questioned since Gregor
Noll’s pioneering article was published in 2003 (Noll, “Visions of the exceptional”, op. cit.). See Agamben’s
State of Exception, Chicago, University of Chicago, 2004. This approach was reinforced by the simultaneous
rediscovery of the work of Hannah Arendt on the fate of the refugee in the mid-twentieth century and the
use of the theoretical legacy of Michel Foucault to explain the increasing restrictive management of migra-
tory flows. There are significant differences between Agamben, Arendt, and Foucault. The Refugee Studies
Centre in Oxford also devoted an entire seminar series, entitled, “Camp Life: Exception, Emergence and
Spaces of Forced Migration” (2007), to these new approaches. The seminar included the following papers: B.
Nielsen, “Policing the borders of politics: Camps in the global context”, N. Sigona, “The comfort of
exceptionality: Roma coping strategies in nomad camps in Italy”, J. Edkins, “Missing, displaced, disap-
peared: Persons in a state of emergency”, M. Duffield, “Development and emergency: Containing the
migratory effects of underdevelopment”, B. Diken, “From refugee camps to gated communities: A culture
of exception”, and R. Andrijasevic, “From exception to excess: Re-reading detention and deportation in
today’s Europe”.
24 The Stockholm Programme replaced the Hague Programme, which aimed to create a fully functioning
CEAS, in 2010 and will continue through 2014.
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now likely and is joined by a new form of camp, the Emergency Transit Centre
(the first of which opened in Romania in 2008), which highlights a new way
forward. Conceivably, the road to more equitable burden sharing and the rise of
an offshore-quota refugee regime within Europe may be on the horizon. In my
conclusion, I return to the conundrum of embedded liberalism, which charac-
terizes European policy and has been the main theme and driver of all my work
in this area.
2. Situating the historical context and a counterfactual history
The possibility of a policy of refugee resettlement through and within the EU
poses a useful counterfactual historical question. Are the recent developments in
Romania and in the Stockholm Programme anticipated by the Kosovo crisis of
1999? By the late 1990s and the early 2000s, extraterritorial zones and regional
protection plans were being framed as pragmatic and liberal developments even
in an era when immigration, the War on Terror, and citizenship and assimilation
were the “hot button” issues of European politics.25 This may be a naı¨ve and an
untenable interpretation of what policy-makers and politicians were doing in
actuality. Even if one were to be sceptical about motives, however, it would still
be important from a constructivist26 viewpoint in order to explain how they sold
these policies to escape the twinges of their own consciences, thereby preserving
an image of a Europe which was differentiated from Bush’s America and repre-
sented a Europe of liberal norms, of soft power, and of embedded liberalism. Yet,
I believe such a conclusion may be overly cynical. Although geo-political realism
and rational choice theory have been invoked by several academics to explain the
weakness of intra- and inter-European burden sharing, ideas and norms indeed
matter.27 A major violation of legal obligation remains unthinkable, or violations
are carried out in the shadows because the collective self-construction of liber-
alism relies heavily on the public endorsement of the 1951 Refugee Convention
by politicians and parliaments.
25 For overviews of migration and European societies since 1945, see C.-U. Schierup, P. Hansen, and S. Castles,
Migration, Citizenship and the European Welfare State. A European Dilemma, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006; C. A. Parsons and T. M. Smeeding, Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2006; A. Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-War Migration to Western
Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
26 Constructivism is a social scientific methodology inspired by the post-modern turn in the humanities and the
social sciences, which emphasizes the need to take seriously the worldviews and narratives constructed by
policy-makers. Constructivism is suspicious of the objectivity of technocratic policy-making or what is found
in the official archive, and imports the tools of post-modern literary criticism, psychoanalysis, and cultural
history to understand how one policy wins acceptance in a given epistemic policy-making community. See A.
Betts, Protection by Persuasion, op. cit. See also A. Betts, Forced Migration and Global Politics, Chichester,
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 18–43.
27 E. R. Thielemann and T. Dewan, “The myth of free-riding: Refugee protection and implicit burden-
sharing”, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006, 351–69; A. Betts, “What does ‘efficiency’ mean in the context
of the global refugee regime?”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8(2), 2006, 148–73. See
the critiques of R. C. Smith, “Outsourcing refugee protection responsibilities: The second life of an incon-
scionable idea”, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, 14(1), 2004, 137–53.
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Thus, the Kosovo experience of 1999, in the context of proposals for extra-
territorial zones and European camps within the borders of the EU itself, could
be a model of equitable burden sharing between the Member States of the EU,
with the potential to strengthen the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is my conten-
tion that the shocks of the mass movements of Kosovar refugees in the spring of
1999, in the context of the previous shameful events at Srebrenica four years
earlier, posed a potential turning point in the history of asylum and refugee
policy in Europe, when history did not turn.28 In the history of regime creation,
the 1951 Refugee Convention itself was a product of liberal revulsion and guilt
in the aftermath of the Second World War. It also arose in order to reinforce
stability in the post-war settlement, which was threatened by the unresolved issue
of refugees and displaced persons. Afterwards, the arrival of Cold War Europe
froze a certain way of interpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention until the 1980s
and 1990s when refugee streams shifted to the Global South and the former
Yugoslavia.29 Similarly, a new regime in Europe might have been established
after 1999 if the Serbians had not withdrawn immediately. Admittedly, at the
height of the crisis, much to the anger of the German government, the French
and British were at first reluctant to accept their share of refugees. In the end,
however, they prepared themselves to take tens of thousands of Kosovars, whose
presence in Macedonia and elsewhere threatened the overall stability of the
Balkans, in the eventuality of a long-term crisis.30 Indeed, public opinion
flip-flopped: in the UK, for example, after mounting a hostile campaign against
the Kosovars in the spring of 1999, the press and their readers seemed to cham-
pion their protection.31
The aim of this counterfactual history is to show that, far from supporting
Giorgio Agamben’s nightmarish vision, camps founded on a policy of resettle-
ment may have initiated a system of effective burden sharing in certain contexts.
It is not unreasonable to argue that a new European refugee agency, charged with
supervising burden sharing on a regular basis rather than merely during times of
mass flight, might have been the result. The Kosovo crisis, in the broader context
of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession in the 1990s, would have been the shock
to transform the regime in Europe rapidly to full-fledged supranationalism, in
28 For a general discussion of the Kosovo crisis, see J. Van Selm-Thornburn (ed.), Kosovo’s Refugees in the
European Union, London, Continuum, 2000.
29 C. M. Skran, The International Refugee Regime and the Refugee Problem in Interwar Europe, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1995; G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics. A Perilous Path, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001; B. Cronin, Institutions of the Common Good: International Protection Regimes in
International Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; M. Mazower, “The strange triumph
of human rights 1933-1950”, Historical Journal, 47(2), 2004, 379–98; E. Haddad, The Refugee in
International Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008; G. Loescher, A. Betts, and J. Milner,
UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection into the 21st Century, London, Routledge, 2008; M.
Mazower, No Enchanted Palace. The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations,
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.
30 A. Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009,
155–6.
31 P. Marfleet, Refugees in a Global Era, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 161.
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the same way that the post-war era gave birth to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The Kosovar refugee crisis passed too quickly and did not create the grounds for
rapid liberalization. On the other hand, neither the War on Terror nor the
uncertainties of globalization undermined the Geneva regime. Instead of an
age of exception, as Didier Bigo argues, the current era is one of unease and
insecurity in which targeted technocratic surveillance allows much of Europe’s
population to be exempted from exceptional measures, the rule of law to not be
suspended but finessed, and migratory flows to be managed, albeit at times
illegally, but not to be staunched.32
Furthermore, in light of the events in the former Yugoslavia, one should not
be so quick to stereotype camps as sites of what Agamben terms “bare life” and of
unaccountability, whose denizens are invisible and barely human: a Gulag of
refugee warehouses, as one critic in a review of UNHCR camps puts it.33 The
thick social good of protection and security34 cannot readily be dismissed;
Agamben’s “aesthetics of pure disaster”35 provided refugees with a path to au-
thenticity, not safety.36 But Srebrenica was a failure because it did not live up to
its name as a “safe haven”, because the refugees’ Dutch protectors abdicated their
mission and left 8,000 Bosnian men and boys to their fate.37 Thus, the Yugoslav
Wars of Succession can be read through a consequentialist ethics, an ethics which
is pragmatic,38 rather than Agamben’s unworkable absolutist ethics and therefore
camps can save lives and are not the epitome of “bare life”, as the Italian
philosopher argues.
Agamben and his more enthusiastic followers lack any proportionality,
when they distastefully lump together varieties of refugee camps, Auschwitz,
32 D. Bigo, “Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease”, Alternatives, 27,
2002, 63–92; D. Bigo, “Security, exception, and surveillance”, in D. Lyon (ed.), Theorizing Surveillance: The
Panopticon and Beyond, London, Willan Publishing, 2006, 46–68; D. Bigo, “Detention of foreigners, states
of exception, and the social practices of control of the banopoticon”, in P. K. Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr
(eds.), Borderscapes. Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Press, 2007, 3–33; D. Bigo, “Globalized (in) Security. The field and the ban-opticon”, in D. Bigo and A.
Tsoukala (eds.), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Iliberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, London,
Routledge, 2008, 10–45. See also related approaches by J. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear,
Migration and Asylum in the EU, London, Routledge, 2006; V. Squire, The Exclusionary Politics of
Asylum, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; R. Vans Munster, Securitizing Immigration. The Politics
of Risk in the EU, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
33 J. Stevens, “Prisons of the stateless. The derelictions of UNHCR”, New Left Review, 42, 2006, 53–67.
34 I. Loader and N. Walker, Civilizing Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 31, 91–3, 140,
258–64.
35 See the piercing critique of Agamben by P. Mesnard, “The political philosophy of Giorgio Agamben: A
critical evaluation”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 5(1), 2004, 139 (139–57).
36 J. Huysmans, “The jargon of exception-on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society”,
International Political Sociology, 2(2), 2008, 177–8.
37 C. Dubernet, The International Containment of Displaced Persons: Humanitarian Spaces without Exit,
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001.
38 J. Snyder, “Realism, refugees, and strategies of humanitarianism”, in A. Betts and G. Loescher (eds.), Refugees
in International Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2011.
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and even gated communities.39 Refugees are not cannon fodder for radical
metaphysical arguments,40 and should not be equated to (a historically inaccur-
ate) mass of passive, half-dead inmates of Auschwitz’s work camps. Far more
inmates there and in the pure death camps of Operation Reinhard died within
hours of arrival; hale and healthy individuals were reduced to ash within hours,
as the camps were established to exterminate, not to house, populations of
displaced people.41 Thus, as Elspeth Guild argues, “refugees are neither victims
nor Homo Sacer; they are struggling for their rights”.42
By treating refugees or forced migrants as passive, hapless victims, academ-
ics and policy-makers would be misled and would misinterpret the active role
played by both. In any case, the failure of a Fortress Europe policy and the
embracing of managed migration is precise evidence of the realization by the EU
of this stubborn reality.43 But, not only does Agamben orientalize or exoticize the
refugee, he also overly dramatizes the camp and, by doing so, is of little use in
understanding the varieties of camps present (including the semi-formal camp in
Sangatte, long-term regional camps, processing camps for offshore/resettled refu-
gees, extraterritorial camps, etc.), which cannot be understood in the same con-
text.44 A recent study divided refugees into situational refugees fleeing from
violence, persecuted refugees, and State-in-exile refugees. Their camps can be
mapped onto a spectrum of forms of governance from those run democratically,
through the despotism of warrior refugees, or through the benign imperialism of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international NGOs.45 As we shall
see, these varieties of camps and their governance are relevant to the present
discussion, especially when one addresses the question of the legal status and the
position of the inmates within the varieties of extraterritorial camps.46
In summary, the shock of Kosovo might have shifted Europeans to an
EU-wide, burden-sharing regime, as the bedrock for a supranational form of
extraterritorial processing. Nevertheless, this external shock may not have
been enough. Lessons from the Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) in the
39 B. Diken and C. Bagge, The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp, London, Routledge, 2005.
40 P. Owens, “Beyond ‘bare life’: Refugees and the ‘right to have rights’, in Betts and Loescher, Refugees, op. cit.
41 M. Mazower, “Foucault, Agamben: Theory and the Nazis”, Boundary 2, 35(1), 2008, 23–34.
42 E. Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010, 25.
43 P. Nyers, “Taking rights, Mediating wrongs: Disagreement over the political agency of non-status refugees”,
in J. Huysmans, A. Dobson, and R. Prokhonik (eds.), The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political
Agency, London, Routledge, 2006, 48–67; R. Puggioni, “Resisting sovereign power: camps in-between
exception and dissent”, in ibid., 71, 76–77; P. Nyers, Rethinking Refugees beyond States of Emergency,
London, Routledge, 2006; V. Pupavic, “Refugee advocacy, traumatic representations and political disen-
chantment”, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 270–92. R. Andrijasevic, “From exception to excess:
Detention and deportations across the Mediterranean space”, in N. de Genova and N. Peutz (eds.), The
Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement, Chapel Hill, Duke University Press,
2010.
44 Debenedetti, “Externalization”, op. cit. 5–6.
45 S. K. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps. Civil War, amd the Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid,
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2005; Nyer, Rethinking, op. cit.
46 R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration. How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went
Away, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 61–2, 378–459.
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Global South are not very reassuring, as they failed in the 2000s when African
partners came to the conclusion that they were mere burden-shifting exercises.
The ill-fated UNHCR Convention Plus exercise of 2003–05 lacked the winning
combination of elements, which had seen the success of previous efforts in
Central America and Indochina.47 The RPPs lacked solid issue cross-linkages
between Africans and Europeans, an effective UNHCR facilitator, and the pres-
ence of a powerful sovereign hegemonic power or even a condominium of na-
tions with shared interests (as the CEAS was still a work in progress).48 As
Alexander Betts puts it, the conditions for a suasion game were not present.49
With the decline of solidarist African socialism and political liberalization, local
populations were paradoxically “free to hate”. Under pressure from increasingly
xenophobic citizens, the governments of Tanzania and Kenya refused to play
their parts in this European game of remote-control migration. Africans had
learned the fine arts of restrictionism by observing the behaviour of their
European partners.50 Thus, the concept of burden sharing within the EU was
honoured sporadically, under the pressure of extreme events such as Kosovo, but
burden shifting (from Germany to her partners in the 1990s) was the driver for
the growing restrictive policies within Europe itself which, in turn, was mani-
fested as another bout of burden-shifting when it was applied to the policies of
RPPs in the Global South.51
However, extraterritorialization was also checkmated because it threatened
the existential basis of politics in Europe. A comparison further afield is useful.
Leaving aside the legality of the Pacific or Caribbean Solutions, the Australians
and the Americans always argued that extraterritorial processing camps were
acceptable precisely because, as self-described countries of immigration, such
policies could be linked to their regimes of accepting offshore refugees, which
fitted naturally into their migration policy and their national narratives, while
Europe wanted an immigrant labour force without an immigrant society.
Thus, in 2004, for example, the United States (US), Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand accepted 100,000 offshore/resettled/sponsored refugees,
Europe accepted a mere 4,000 and, 5 years later, Europe accepted just under
47 A. Betts and J.-F. Durieux, “Convention Plus as a norm-setting exercise”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(3),
2007, 509–35; M. Zieck, “Doomed to fail from the outset? UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative revisited”,
International Review of Refugee Law, 21(3), 2009, 367–420.
48 See also G. Loescher and J. Milner, “The missing link: The need for a comprehensive engagement in regions
of refugee origin”, International Affairs, 79(3), 2003, 583–617; E. Haddad, “The external dimension of EU
refugee policy: A new approach to asylum?”, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 190–205.
49 The most comprehensive account is Betts’s Protection by Persuasion op. cit, “suasion game”, 32.
50 For an overview see, J. Milner, Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009, especially, 45, 52–3, 163, 171–77. In certain cases, African States (Guinea) employed a
cooperative policy to secure more aid from European partners, so long as the aid extended to the population
beyond the encampments, 165. But the Kenyans were less cooperative: “We do not consider that Kenya
should be the automatic or natural home for asylum-seekers and refugees from Somalia”, quoted in Betts,
Protection by Persuasion, op. cit. 170. See also A. Betts and J. Milner, “The externalization of EU asylum
policy: The position of the African states”, Working Paper No. 36, Oxford, COMPAS, 2006.
51 Levy, “The European Union after 9/11”, op. cit.
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7 per cent of the total global offshore refugees for 2009.52 Therefore, the issues
surrounding burden sharing in Europe were not merely affected by the unique
constitutional machinery of the confederal EU, which prevented the creation of a
European Refugee Agency with State-like powers to impel Member States to
accept a quota of refugees, unlike the merely technical, “hand-holding” remits
of the European Refugee Fund (ERF) or EASO. Rather, the issue goes to the core
of the national legitimacy of the Member States. Whether or not the 1973 mi-
gration stop was more illusion than reality, it was only in the late 1990s or early
2000s that Member States openly, and in public documents, welcomed and
acknowledged a system of managed migration, bowing to the compelling logics
of globalization and an ageing population. The elastic, “Competition State”
heralded a new era of labour migration to and within Europe, where imported
unskilled and highly skilled labour were seen as central to economic security and to
the well-being of the nation.53 On the other hand, as I have mentioned, offering
hospitality to refugees was an ethical–legal duty, the bedrock to the concept of
liberalism. Nowhere in the EU, however, was migration essential to the national
story, as is the case in the Immigration States. Indeed, the basis for citizenship in
most countries was converging on some form of modified jus sanguinis.54 Andrew
Geddes has detected a detachment of a strictly one-dimensional relationship
between territorial borders and status. Thus, he envisages three types of borders:
organizational (encompassing the graduated membership requirements to access
labour markets, the Welfare State, and eventually citizenship), conceptual (per-
taining to the degree of assimilation with specific regard to language, politics, and
rituals), and territorial (notably the borders of the Member States, the borders of
Schengen, and the borders of the EU).55
However, even if one can detect a multi-level series of statuses from irregular
migrant to full citizen, the EU and its Member States are not geared to accept
immigration as the life’s blood for the future of their national societies. This
issue has never properly been addressed and, when raised outside academic cir-
cles, the discussion is prompted and framed by the xenophobic Far Right.56
52 R. Luubers, “Put an end to their wandering”, The Guardian, 20 Jun. 2003, 5; European Commission,
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the establishment
of a joint EU resettlement programme”, Com (2009) 447 Final, 2 Sept. 2009, 6.
53 G. Menz, The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Non-State Actors, Europeanization and the Politics of
Managing Migration, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
54 J. van Selm, “Refugee Protection Policies and Security Issues”, in E. Newman and J. van Selm (eds.), Refugees
and Forced Displacement: International Security, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2003, 66–92;
Schierup, Hansen and Castles, Migration, Citizenship and the European Welfare State, op. cit.
55 A. Geddes, “Europe’s borders relationship and international migration relations”, Journal of Common Market
Studies, 43(4), 2005, 787–806.
56 The Centre Right has sometimes prepared the ground for more radical proposals of the Far Right or has been
influenced by the Far Right by competing for the same voters. See T. Bale, “Turning around the telescope,
centre-right parties and immigration and integration policy in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy,
15(3), 2006, 315–30. There is vast literature on the roles of EU citizenship and/or EU legal space in
constructing a new settlement based on shared human rights values. There is also radical academic literature
which embraces open borders in Europe for regular and irregular migrants but would merely exacerbate the
xenophobia already present. See D. Spence, “The cosmopolitanization of the EU’s borders”, Portal. Journal of
Multidisciplinary International Studies, 4(2), 2007, 1–17. See Elspeth Guild’s criticisms of the no-borders
position, Security and Migration, op. cit. 27.
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Equally, the first premises of the real implementation of immigration practice
within each of the Member States are not discussed with great candour between
the Member States themselves, because they are kept as confidential matters
within the national discussion of each. This leads to misunderstandings of
what a mixed flow of migrants in the early twentieth century really means
and, in turn, results in a misleading picture of what the common external
policy of the CEAS should be.
Thus, it is argued that Italy is the soft underbelly of the Schengen system
when, in fact, it has been shown recently that Italy receives more irregular mi-
grants from Germany, where citizens of the western Confederation of
Independent States (CIS) who are on expired work visas make their way south
to Italy. It has also been noted that Italy, which acceded to the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees just over twenty years ago, has a particularly
low rate of asylum-seeker recognition but that this is because many would-be
asylum-seekers are swept into legality via regularization and/or the acquisition of
work visas. Whereas massive regularizations are not carried out in Germany
because they would undermine the hegemonic ideology of State effectiveness,
the granting of asylum remains a long-established practice, enshrined in its Basic
Law and part of the post-war process of political rehabilitation. In this respect,
Germany appears to be a more diligent member of the 1951 Refugee
Convention than Italy when, in practice, an arguably similar number of refugees
find an ad hoc regime of protection in Italy’s porous labour markets. Most
irregular immigration in Italy entails persons from the CIS who overstay their
visas in Germany and, subsequently, arrive in Italy via secondary migration
contrary to the more newsworthy, alarming, and heart-rending images of boat
people landing on Lampedusa. The latter, however, feed the populist grand-
standing policies of maritime push-backs in the Mediterranean or extraterritorial
camps in Libya.57
3. The common european asylum system: liberal or illiberal?
The first premises of the migration regime in Europe should be recalled before
we enter into a review of the state of play of the CEAS in 2010. First, as I have
mentioned previously, the EU acknowledged that a form of managed migration
or mixed flows was the starting point of policy-making and, as a consequence,
the rhetoric of a Fortress Europe was no longer taken seriously in the policy
community. Member State governments, such as Italy’s Berlusconi administra-
tion dependent on the support of radical right populists, have balanced
fire-breathing restrictionist rhetoric with one of the most generous regulariza-
tions of irregular migrants in the past 30 years: Italy’s middle-class families
depend on carers to look after children and elderly parents; crops require har-
vesting, and the mini-steel mills of “Deep North” Brescia would grow silent
57 C. Finotelli, “The importance of being southern: The making of policies of immigration control in Italy”,
European Journal of Migration and Law, 11(2), 2009, 119–38; C. Finotelli, “The North-South myth revised:
A comparison of the Italian and German migration regimes”, West European Politics, 32(5), 2009, 886–903.
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without workers from outside the EU. Like the Italians, most Member States
have resorted to grandstanding although, in reality, they implement more prag-
matic policies towards these mixed flows of migrants.58 It has been estimated
that:
[A]lmost every Western European state except Finland has carried out some
sort of amnesty in the past few years. Indeed perhaps 40 regularizations have
taken place in Europe over the past decade, giving legal status to over 3
million people.59
At Stockholm, the European Council sternly denounced further national regu-
larizations for undermining the credibility of EU polices, but a recent academic
report concludes that, “regardless of political declarations, amnesties will be
undertaken furtively by all but a few European countries”.60
Similarly, all Member States have tightened their domestic laws to make it
generally impossible for asylum-seekers, waiting to be assessed, from entering
their labour markets and therefore they become reliant on aid from host gov-
ernments. They also insist that they welcome non-EU workers with high skills
and indeed through the Blue Card system seek to attract the skilled from around
the globe. In segregating asylum-seekers from domestic labour markets, Member
States feed the misconceptions about asylum-seekers and welfare and fuel the rise
of the xenophobic Far Right. This, in turn, has accelerated the very policies of
non-entre´e that are being undermined by “furtive amnesties”. These policies of
the Member States, likewise, have not helped clarify the importance of different
statuses in the minds of the European public, as studies have demonstrated that
citizens do not easily differentiate between asylum-seekers, non-European eco-
nomic migrants, and economic migrants from the new accession States.61
Equally, the longstanding myth of the universality of the Refugee
Convention remains in place in 2010: the overwhelming majority of
asylum-seekers do not receive full Convention status recognition but the con-
straints of non-refoulement, the Convention Against Torture, and indeed the new
safeguards of the Treaty of Lisbon will not change this status quo.62
This reciprocal circle of hypocritical policy-making, this form of political
grandstanding as a political art form, has made it very difficult for academic
analysts to give a balanced account of the effects of the CEAS programme in
2010 because they mistake restrictive rhetoric for realities on the ground. These
realities can be more flexible through implementation gaps, the pragmatic
58 A. Geddes, “Il rombo dei cannoni? Immigration and the centre-right in Italy”, West European Politics, 15(3),
2006, 349–66.
59 E. Collett, “Beyond Stockholm: Overcoming the inconsistencies of immigration policy”, EPC Working
Paper No. 32, Brussels, European Policy Centre, Dec. 2009, 48.
60 Ibid., 49.
61 A. Geddes, “Chronicle of a crisis foretold: The politics of smuggling in the UK”, British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, 7(3), 2005, 324–39.
62 Levy, “The European Union since 9/11”, op. cit. 33.
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hypocrisy of amnesties, and the persistence of a frayed form of embedded
liberalism.63
Nevertheless, several things are clear. After more than a decade of EU
legislation, the process has still not left the phase of oxymoronic intergovern-
mental supranationalism: the CEAS is still a work-in-progress, with the final
document at Stockholm proclaiming 2012 as a new target date for its fulfilment.
Indeed, one informed observer has even queried “whether a fully functioning
Common European Asylum System is still the core goal of the EU member
states”.64 Even if domestic grandstanding might still be prevalent at the EU level,
“there is a conscious and definite shift towards more practical forms of European
cooperation”,65 noted in the rise of the role of agencies and variations on the
theme of the open method of coordination.
The major aims of EU asylum policy have been the control of spontaneous
movement into the Union and the prevention of secondary movement once
asylum-seekers have entered its border. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, this
consequently has meant the creation of a working system for the assignment
of exclusive responsibility for the examination of asylum claims, the establish-
ment of a minimum standard of reception conditions, and the definition of
refugee and asylum conditions. Its history, however, has been one of delays
and inconsistencies.66 Indeed, the Dublin II system is currently under
re-examination, with observers claiming that it is costly and inhumane and
that it fails to prevent secondary movement. If Dublin II cannot function, it
remains to be seen how a more stringent form of burden sharing can function in
present conditions.67 In any case, Eikko Thielemann, the leading scholar on
European burden sharing, concludes that the historical path of cultural and
historical ties dependent on chain migration, language, and post-colonial ties
overrides the might of Dublin II.68
Essentially, the Member States have agreed to disagree about fundamental
issues that determine the prevention of secondary movement. Thus, wildly
varying recognitions rates for asylum-seekers remain in force: in 2007, Italy
recognized 98 per cent of all Afghan asylum-seekers, the UK recognized 42
63 G. Lahav and V. Guiraudon, “Actors and venues in immigration control: Closing the gap between political
demands and policy outcomes, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006, 201–33; A. Ellermann, “Street-level
democracy: How immigration bureaucrats manage public opposition”, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006,
293–309; H. G. Sicakkan, “Political asylum and sovereignty-sharing in Europe”, Government and
Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 206–22.
64 Collett, “Beyond Stockholm”, op. cit. 29.
65 Ibid.
66 For an overview of the CEAS in 2010, see A. Geddes, Beyond Fortress Europe, 2nd edn., Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 2008, 131–8; O. Ferguson Sidorenko, The Common European Asylum
System. Background to the Current States of Affairs and Future Directions, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser,
2007; S. Lavenex, “Justice and Home Affairs. Communitarization with Hesitation”, in H. Wallace, M.
A. Pollack and A. R. Young (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2010, 457–77.
67 Collett, “Beyond Stockholm”, op. cit. 28.
68 E. R. Thielemann, “The Effectiveness of Governments’ Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration”, in
Parsons and Smeeding, Immigration, op. cit. 468–9.
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per cent of all Afghans, and Greece denied all Afghan cases.69 In the same year,
Sweden accepted 18,000 Iraqi asylum-seekers, equivalent to more than half of
those who entered the EU.70 Furthermore, such domestically based recognition
procedures are reinforced by the fact that Member States do not recognize the
status granted to individuals by their fellow Member States.71 As the European
Commission and the European Parliament admitted in 2008, “a common
European asylum system does not imply as yet a transfer of responsibility for
receiving asylum seekers and processing claims to the European Union”,72 nor
does it seem likely that “EU Member States by adopting the Lisbon Treaty were
prepared to completely give up their specific concepts of accommodating pro-
tection needs”.73
From 2003 to 2008, most of the other objectives listed above passed into
European law. Critics have argued that this process has been a race to the bottom
and an attempt to finalize the restrictionist policies of major Member States,
such as Germany or the UK, to repel asylum-seekers from the core of the EU
and, thus, also to further a policy of extraterritorial processing.74 The restrictive
effects of the recent legislation are probably exaggerated: several recent surveys
have shown how the Directives have not lowered conditions for asylum-seekers
in the EU 15, and the 2004 and 2007 accession Member States have incorpo-
rated a raft of newly minted domestic legislation under the guidance of the
European Commission, which has seen a marked improvement in asylum and
refugee law and policy in the East.75 Furthermore, the definition of an
asylum-seeker has been expanded to include victims of non-State actors. Thus,
for example, we see a noticeable increase of the recognition rate for Somalis in
Germany, where courts were chary to recognize refugees from Failed States.
69 E. Guild and S. Carrera, “Towards the next phrase of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The
European Commission’s Proposal for the Stockholm Programme”, the Centre for European Policy Studies
Policy Brief No. 196, 20 Aug. 2009, 5.
70 “EU ready to accept 10,000 Iraqis”, BBC News, 28 Nov. 2008.
71 S. Lavenex, “Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy”, Journal of
European Public Policy, 14(5), 2007, 765; S. Peers, “Legislative update: EU immigration and asylum com-
petence and decision-making in the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10(2), 2008,
234–6.
72 European Union and European Parliament, “Towards a Common European Asylum System: Assessment and
Proposals-Elements to be Implemented for the Establishment of an Efficient and Coherent System”,
Brussels, Sept. 2008, 1.
73 Ibid., 2.
74 This was already noted as a universal trend in the West in the early 2000s. See M. J. Gibney and R. Hanson,
“Asylum policy in the West: Past trends, future possibilities”, in G. J. Borjas and J. Crisp (eds.), Poverty,
International Migrations and Asylum, Basingstoke, Macmillan Palgrave, 2005, 84.
75 C. Kaunert, “Liberty versus security”, op. cit. 151; E. Thielemann and N. El-Enamy, “Beyond Fortress
Europe? How European cooperation strengthens refugee protection”, Fifth General Conference of the
ECPR, Potsdam, 10–12 Sept. 2009. The improvement of asylum and refugee policy in part of
the European Neighbourhood should also be noted: L. Feijin, “Facing the asylum-enlargement nexus:
The establishment of asylum systems in the Western Balkans”, International Journal of Refugee Law,
20(3), 2008, 413–31. A more jaundiced view of the effects of the European legislation was advanced by
Elspeth Guild: See “The Europeanization of Europe’s asylum policy”, International Journal of Refugee Law,
18(3–4), 2006, 630–51.
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However, while it is true that common mutually recognized standards may halt a
downward spiral of conditions, the advocates of this argument fail to see that,
before this European legislation, the policies of rigorous restrictionism were
already firmly in place in the West. Furthermore, Member States have twisted
human rights laws, as Matthew Gibney shows in his study of the British deport-
ation regime, to be in favour of 1951 Refugee Convention but simultaneously
undermine its basic intent.76
Thus, the internal asylum and refugee regime of the EU is still a process
marked by conflicting restrictionist and liberal tendencies and is left in a limbo
of intentional ambiguity. Increasingly:
constellations of states are emerging, whether along geographical lines or
based on common interest (see, for example, the Pru¨m group, C.L.). The
majority of new ideas of the last few years have been instigated and put into
practice by governments, with secondary support from the Commission.77
Thus, the Stockholm document notes that there is neither a legal impediment for
some Member States “to establish common institutions for processing asylum
seekers and/or specialized boards deciding on appeals against negative asylum
decisions”78 nor is there a means to prevent certain Member States from banding
together to experiment cooperatively with Europeanized asylum procedures.
From the point of view of the European Commission, a fully functioning
CEAS would be achieved when there was a shift from the voluntary to the
mandatory and the abolition of opt-out clauses, joined to full harmonization
of mutually recognized standards down to individual determination. This has
not been achieved so far. Whether or not the Lisbon Treaty will allow the
European Court of Justice supremacy over domestic courts to create a legal
asylum space in the EU remains to be seen. However, the Stockholm IGC
probably marked a watershed and the current programme:
reflects the fact that the EU has now reached the outer edges of political
cooperation on immigration and asylum, and has put in place most of the
major legislative initiatives which are currently feasible. The focus is on
strengthening cooperation within the EU and with third countries, and
the need to consolidate the work done over the past decade.79
4. Is there life after extraterritorial processing?
An EU programme of supranational extraterritorial processing is impossible
without a fully functioning CEAS, but the fate of extraterritorial processing in
the EU remains in an analogous condition of intentional ambiguity to the CEAS
76 M. Gibney, “Asylum and the expansion of deportation in the United Kingdom”, Government and
Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 146–67.
77 Collett, “Beyond Stockholm”, op. cit. 21.
78 European Union and European Parliament, “Towards”, op. cit. 1.
79 Collett, “Beyond Stockholm”, op. cit. 24.
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and the EU itself. EU supranational extraterritorial processing may prove un-
successful lacking greater integration within the EU itself, but naked sovereign
interests were not the only blockage as embedded liberalism also acted as another
formidable veto player at key turning points in the debate. I conclude by high-
lighting the use of intentional ambiguity in this field and demonstrate how more
pragmatic policies on the ground echo the logic that motivates furtive amnesties
within the EU itself.
As mentioned previously, the antecedents to the push for extraterritorial
processing can be found in the Yugoslav “safe areas” of the early 1990s as well as
earlier in the Danish global proposal to the United Nation General Assembly in
1986, although the latter was closer to the establishment of RPPs in that they
were envisaged near-conflict zones in the Global South and not on the borders of
the EU itself. The Dutch inspired suggestions at the High Level Working Group
on Asylum and Migration Policies in 1999. However, these systems of external-
ization and temporary protection were seen as ways to preserve the sanctity of the
1951 Refugee Convention. Meanwhile, the various British, Danish, German,
and Italian plans from 2001 to 2005 were largely envisaged as systems to replace
the 1951 Refugee Convention.80 The two events that weigh heavily on the burst
of activity from 2001 to 2005 were the previously discussed Kosovo crisis of the
spring of 1999 and the leaked Austrian Presidency paper of 1998 discussed at
length at Tampere in 1999.81 The Austrian paper resembles the process of the
externalization of refugee and asylum policy, as carried out repeatedly from 1999
through today by the EU, but differs in key aspects, which I examine.
The Austrian paper more or less matches the geo-political map of migration
in 2010 (an inner circle of the EU Member States now expanded eastwards; a
second circle of the Western Balkans candidate or near-candidate countries for
EU membership; a third circle of the European Neighbourhood countries in the
CIS and North Africa; a fourth circle of countries, the Sub Saharan African
countries, China, etc.). The Austrian Presidency draft paper was sharply criti-
cized by the French and Germans because it directly threatened the principle of
non-refoulement and confused the issues of asylum and economic migration. In
the spring of 2000, at the European Conference on Asylum, sponsored by the
then current Portuguese Presidency of the European Council, the British Home
Secretary, Jack Straw, called for a redrafting of the Geneva Convention. Like the
Austrian plan, he suggested an international quota system under which European
countries would share asylum-seekers from countries recognized as violators of
human rights. Straw’s suggestions were criticized for confusing temporary pro-
tection with the Geneva system of individual determination of cases and for
undermining the concept of non-refoulement by creating an ad hoc system of safe
countries. In the spring of 2003, the British government released its “Vision
80 See Afeef, “The politics”, op. cit.; Betts, “The international relations”, op. cit.; Garlick, “The EU discussion”,
op. cit.; Levy, “The European Union after 9/11”, op. cit.; Noll, “Visions of the exceptional”, op. cit.
81 For a discussion of Tampere, see I. Boccardi, Europe and Refugees: Towards an EU Asylum Policy, The Hague,
Kluwer Law International, 2002, 175–80.
Refugees, Europe, Camps/State of Exception 109
 by guest on Septem
ber 27, 2010
rsq.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Paper” that rapidly became the basis for a discussion between the EU and
UNHCR. This is where the Danish and Austrian plans of the 1980s and
1990s were melded together and the twin proposals for “transit processing
camps” outside but near the EU and “regional processing centres” closer to
the countries of origin in the South also were examined. The Danes dusted
off the 1986 proposal during their Presidency in the second half of 2002. Yet,
at the same time, they let the British “take the heat” for this series of contro-
versial proposals, which were considered “superb” by the Far Right Danish
People’s Party, a party that held the balance of power in the Danish parliament
and kept the then centre-right government in power.82
The fate of the RPPs has already been discussed and they were even less
controversial within the EU. The suggestion of establishing “transit processing
centres” sparked a fierce argument, as suggested by Gregor Noll’s path-breaking
academic article in 2003, which Amnesty International disseminated to the
general public. Opponents of extraterritorial processing noted the policy transfer
from the Australian Pacific, American Caribbean, and European Kosovo plans,
but it was argued that the British proposal was more radical because it suggested
enshrining serial refoulement: asylum-seekers already within the territory of the
EU would be deported to these transit processing centres. The Australians had
invented the “Pacific Solution” precisely to prevent asylum-seekers from touch-
ing Australian soil and thereby forcing their claims to be heard. The “Vision
Paper” took such a policy to its logical if extreme conclusion. Thus, the meeting
of the European Council of 28 March 2003, saw David Blunkett suggest that
Albania and Croatia become venues for screening of all refugees in Europe. This
would make it impossible for spontaneous asylum-seekers to seek refuge in a
Member State and effectively render all attempts illegal. An international quota
system would replace the right of asylum for individual fleeing persecution.
Temporary refugees, caused by mass flight, would, it seemed, be treated under
the same regime, in some ways, making plain what had happened on the ground
since the Yugoslav Wars of Succession.
Blunkett’s plan, at first, received general support from fellow Member States
but they awaited approval from UNHCR. High Commissioner, Ruud Lubbers,
would only approve the plan if it were to be located within the EU and only
entailed processing claimants from “safe countries”. In other words, the very
purpose of the “Vision Paper” was undermined, and the embedded liberalism,
which had shot down the full-fledged endorsement of the Austrian Presidency
paper, had been a motivating factor.83 This time, the Germans and Swedes
declared their principles. Thus, the Swedish Minister of Immigration, Jan
Karlsson, declared: “We are against any sort of system that would deny people
the right to apply for asylum in the country they have sought refuge in”.84
The German response was more muddled; Otto Schily seemed to object in a
82 Levy, “The European Union after 9/11”, op. cit. 44–8.
83 Ibid., 48–9.
84 Migration News Sheet, Jul. 2003, 13.
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similar fashion but he was also reported to have said that it was an ineffective
form of non-entre´e policy because it would reduce the distance asylum-seekers
would have to travel in order to have their claim heard by the EU and its
Member States.85 In the meantime, the European Commission distanced itself
from the British proposal and emphasized the need for burden sharing within the
EU. And, finally, the EU Presidency Conclusions of Tessaloniki on 19–20 June
2003 reiterated the sanctity of the Refugee Convention and the British withdrew
their proposal, seeming intent on pursuing it with the “Coalition of the Willing”
(the Danes and the Dutch).
One further burst of activity occurred between 2004 and 2005, when Schily
(now fully converted to the British approach) and the Italians (Giuseppe Pisanu)
revived the drive and suggested that the Baltic States, Slovakia and Ukraine,
establish such camps. Nevertheless, the situation quickly turned when the
Ukrainians learned of this plan after reading about it in a British newspaper
and angrily denounced the project. In November of 2004, the Hague
Programme pledged to look into the feasibility of joint processing inside and
outside the territory of the EU, but camps were not openly discussed. A final last
gasp was found in Schily’s single paper of 9 September 2005, which was issued as
a press statement at an informal meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs
Ministers in Florence (“Effective Protection for Refugees, Effective Measures
Against Illegal Migrants”). Here, an argument was made for reception centres
in North Africa linked to voluntary burden sharing, but this paper also claimed
that Member States would not have legal liability for the governance of these
camps. Screening was discussed, but protection needs were not raised and, in any
case, all the North African States rejected it.86
At Tampere, Lisbon, Thessaloniki, and Florence, from 1998 to 2005, a
shifting coalition of Member States vetoed or expressed significant concerns
about extraterritorial processing camps if they fatally undermined the 1951
Refugee Convention. By relying on the endorsement of UNHCR at the EU
level, they placed themselves in a precarious position by facing the possibility of a
full-fledged supranational system of burden sharing for offshore and spontaneous
refugees, in which the whole point of playing the non-entre´e policy was in danger
of being undermined, thus the alarm of Schily. The Hague Programme’s vague
promise to investigate extraterritorial processing was weakened by a clause
insisting on “the need for careful assessment of the legality of any potential
processing scheme”.87 Which law would apply in such camps? And where, as
we have seen, was the mandatory European joint burden-sharing system to
facilitate such a system? Thus, just as we have seen that the irreconcilable contra-
dictions of a full-fledged CEAS and especially burden sharing could only be
finessed by intentional ambiguity, the history of supranational extraterritorializa-
tion followed a similar path.
85 D. Dombey, “UK asylum proposals draw mixed response”, Financial Times, 29 Mar. 2003, 12.
86 Garlick, “The EU discussion”, op. cit. 619–20.
87 Ibid., 625.
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Supranational extraterritorialization was also unsuccessful, however, because
putative host countries were not willing to host such camps. As has been noted in
a comparative study, while the Australian and American plans were neo-colonial
in all but name, with one regional hegemonic power using domineering tactics to
accommodate such programmes, the relationship between such hosts as Morocco
or Ukraine and the EU were more balanced than Haiti or Jamaica to the US or
Nauru and Papua New Guinea to Australia, respectively. Host countries, such as
Croatia and Morocco, were worried their international reputations would suffer.
They too did not want to become magnets for greater flows of migrants seeking
to be closer to the EU.88
A new phase of policy-making ensued in 2004–05, when European interior
ministers agreed on five pilot schemes in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania,
and Libya, with funding of one million Euros financed by the European
Commission.89 The era of supranational extraterritorial projects had ceased
and bilateral and multilateral efforts were in the vanguard for the remainder
of the decade. Following 2005, the centre of attention shifted from the estab-
lishment of extraterritorial processing zones and a fixed obsession with security,
to the repackaging of policy employing the concept of the migration–develop-
ment nexus. In the documents and rhetoric of the European Commission and
the European Presidency, the migration–development nexus envisaged migration
as a tool of development rather than merely a problem endangering Europe’s
sovereignty. Especially after the tragic shootings of migrants at Melilla and Ceuta
in the autumn of 2005, a series of meetings between North African countries,
South Saharan African countries, and the EU (Rabat, Tripoli, Madrid, and
Lisbon) signalled this new tact.90 Pilot mobility schemes were signed with
Moldova and Cape Verde. Concepts, which, until the middle of the 2000s,
had been considered outside the EU policy kit and more likely associated with
its academic critics, became standard issue by the time of Stockholm. Thus,
circular migration, “brain gain”, and the linking of diaspora networks with
home countries were conveyed confidently in Commission and Presidency docu-
ments at the end of the decade.91
However, there was still a gap between policies that seemed more measured
and those that received the greatest funding. Thus, the method of supranational
intergovernmentalism produced a neat division of labour: whilst supranational
institutions advanced a human rights approach, Member State governments
pushed for greater migration control through the dissemination of Integrated
Border Management, Frontex, Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITS), and
88 Afeef, “The politics of extraterritorial processing”, op. cit. 28–9; A. Ellermann, “The limits of migration
control: Deportation and inter-state cooperation”, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 168–89.
89 Betts, “Towards a Mediterranean solution?”, op. cit. 660–4.
90 Lavenex and Kunz, “The migration-development nexus”, op. cit. 449–50.
91 Debenedetti, “Externalization of European Asylum”, op. cit. 10. For a critique of the mobility agreements,
see R. Parkes, “EU mobility partnerships: A model of policy coordination?”, European Journal of Migration
and Law, 11(3), 2009, 327–45.
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the dissemination of readmission agreements to North and sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition, the promotion of multilateral and bilateral policies, which drew on
the agencies of the Union in a questionably legal manner, was also evident. The
readmission of Libya into the system of migration control was the most trou-
bling and unresolved example of this ambiguous policy. Beginning in 2003,
Italian governments increasingly worked with Libya. This culminated in a
treaty in 2009 in which the Italians paid compensation for past colonial war
crimes in exchange for joint efforts at pushing back boat people in the
Mediterranean.92 Over the years, the Italians have funded several detention
camps in Libya and, by 2010, of twenty secret detention camps identified in
Libya, three had been established by the Italians. Further complicating this
situation is the fact that Libya is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and, although International Organization for Migration (IOM)
has a presence in the country, it does not have a protection role, albeit
UNHCR has had an increasing presence through the good offices of Libyan
NGOs, even if that presence has not resolved serious faults in Libya’s treatment
of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers.93 The European Commission has
complained about the illegality of the push-back policy but, to date, there has
been no change. Meanwhile, Libya has exaggerated the flow of migrants across
the Mediterranean in order to increase its bargaining power.94 In fact, Libya is
part of a Sahel–Saharan circular migration system formally enshrined in the
Community of Sahel–Sahara States (CEN-SAD), in which migrants have been
drawn to oil-rich Libya but also to Algeria and Morocco to work and have no
intention to travel onward to Europe.95 Meanwhile, bilateral deals have been
struck by France, Spain, and Germany with Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria:
Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE), European external border sur-
veillance system (EUROSUR) (Integrated Border Management technology), and
Frontex have made it increasingly difficult for boat people in the Atlantic or the
Mediterranean to make the passage to Europe. Algeria and Morocco have chan-
ged their migration laws and passed anti-trafficking regulations.96 The new
92 On the re-entry of Libya and their collaboration with the Italians in their push-back policy, see L. Martinez.
“Libya: The conversion of a ‘Terrorist State’”, Mediterranean Politics, 11(2), 2006, 151–65; R. Andrijasevic,
“Lampedusa in focus: migrants caught between the Libyan desert and the deep blue sea”, Feminist Review,
82(1), 2006, 120–5; R. Andrijasevic, “How to balance rights and responsibilities on asylum at the
EU’s southern border of Italy and Libya”, Working Paper No. 27, Oxford, COMPAS, 2006; S.
Hamood, “EU-Libya cooperation on migration: A raw deal for refugees and migrants?”, Journal of
Refugee Studies, 21(1), 2008, 19–42.
93 Buckel and Wissel, “State project Europe”, op. cit. 41; UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal, Geneva, UNHCR,
2010, 4–5; C. Peregin, “Grounds for concern in Libya-UNHCR”, Times of Malta.com, 24 Jan. 2010,
available at: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20100124/local/grounds-for-concern-in-libya-
unhcr (last accessed 20 May 2010). UNHCR was expelled from Libya in June 2010 (see: “Libya ‘expels’
UN refugee agency UNHCR”, BBC News Africa 8 June 2010, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
10264625 (last accessed 26 July 2010).
94 E. Paoletti, “Migration, Security and Interdependence: The Case of the Italian-Libyan Agreement on
Migration”, International Studies Association, 50th Annual Convention, New York, 15–18 Feb. 2009.
95 Andrijasevic, “How to balance”, op. cit. 17.
96 Wolff, “Border management in the Mediterranean”, op. cit.
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frontier is now the Sahara itself, although this is an age-old liminal area of trade
and migration, wherein the cities and towns have increasingly become cosmo-
politan centres for circular and European-bound migrants undergoing journeys
that could take years to complete and of which the status of a refugee who has
left for fear of persecution becomes an economic migrant with time.97
In Africa, we are witnessing a constant shifting of statuses, a battle between
the technical and geographical reconfigurations of migration control, and the
social reorganization of transit migration. As a result, the North African States
effectively have become ad hoc Schengen members although lacking the possi-
bility to become Member States of the EU. A Euro-Mediterranean system of
managed migration, thus, has come into effect without a full acknowledgement
of it.98 Of course, the human cost is well known; thousands have perished in the
Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Sahara.99 A European chain of extraterritorial
camps never materialized; instead, a string of detention camps administered by
North African and Sahel States, in part aided by the EU and the IOM, populate
the landscape. On the one hand, Morocco has sought to heighten its credibility
as an efficient migration manager, in order to win concessions for the legal
movement of Moroccans to Spain and elsewhere.100 On the other hand, in
Morocco, one finds a straggling series of illicit camps, such as in Oudja, in
which well-educated and highly motivated Africans play a cat-and-mouse
game with the police in their attempt to make their way to the Spanish enclaves
or to the European mainland itself.101 These informal and formal camps act as
sieves through which migratory populations flow clandestinely, fearing the State
and traffickers alike. These are not the camps of Agamben’s imagination, the
inmates possess an ingenious agency, and the States, which channel and manage
them, are rather porous, if capriciously violent, entities (especially the Libyan
State).102
Thus, extraterritorial processing camps under the aegis of the supranational
EU were not viable. Certainly, before the Lisbon Treaty increased the potential
oversight capacities of the European Court of Justice and the European
Parliament, the EU did not have the same constitutional legitimacy or political
authority that national States, such as the US and Australia, had. In any case, the
embedded liberalism of the EU, central to its normative framework of soft
97 H. de Haas, “Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends”,
Washington DC, Migration Policy Institute, 2006; M. Collyer, “In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan transit
migrants in Morocco and the fragmented journey to Europe”, Antipode, 39(4), 2007, 668–90.
98 Ibid., 687; S. Mazzella, “Putting asylum to the test: Between immigration policy and co-development”, in
T. Fabre and P. Sant-Cassia (eds.), Between Europe and the Mediterranean. The Challenges and the Fears,
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 41–9.
99 H. M. Cross, “The EU migration regime and West African clandestine migrants”, Journal of Contemporary
European Research, 5(2), 2009, 171–87.
100 Wolff, “Border management in the Mediterranean”, op. cit.
101 M. Carr, “The invisible people of Oujda”, The New York Times as reproduced in The Observer, 2 May 2010,
3.
102 Andrijasevic, “Lampedusa in focus”, op. cit. 124.
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power, undermined the cagey authoritarianism sanctioned by populism, which
drove the American and Australian models. Furthermore, the same practical
problems, which confronted the Pacific or Caribbean solutions, would have
affected the EU, only with greater salience, because legal accountability would
have been even murkier. When migrant flows built up in the camps, what rights
would have failed applicants had at the removal stage? International law might
have prevented refoulement of many failed asylum-seekers. Who would have
taken the legal responsibility for their long-term detention? Extraterritorial pro-
cessing zones would confront the same legal problems that all international
territorial authorities face.103 Asylum-seekers could challenge this in constituent
Member State courts, the host nation’s courts, or possibly the European Court of
Justice. In any case, would closed camps be legal? Why would any Member State
want to venture into such a legal minefield? Indeed, it has been argued that,
precisely for these reasons, the British abandoned their “Vision Paper” after
2003.104 Thus, embedded liberalism led to obvious as well as unintended con-
sequences, as outlined by Noll in 2006, which made such a policy too costly to
pursue.
What is the problem with ‘regional protection areas’ or ‘transit processing
areas’? Essentially, it is the necessity for barbed wire. An RPA or processing
centre must offer human rights protection on a level roughly equivalent to
that within the European Union. This would be necessary to satisfy
European courts that removal to such centres is in accordance with
human rights and refugee law. Then, the barbed wire is needed to keep
out the local population where the country is located. On the other hand, if
RPAs or processing centres offer human rights protection below the
European Union level, migrant inhabitants will continue their efforts to
reach the Union. Barbed wire would need to keep them in. So is extrater-
ritorial processing a better alternative than smugglers? The same amount
will try to get into informal labour markets as today but without filing for
asylum if this means they go to a camp.105
5. Conclusion: resettlement camps, quotas, and resettlement
programmes – a long march to effective burden
sharing in the EU?
As we have seen, the draconian and unilateral predictions of European extrater-
ritorial processing did not materialize. In 2010, we are presented with a more
103 Garlick, “The EU discussion”, op. cit. 622; K. de Vries, “An assessment of ‘Protection in Regions of Origin’
in relation to European asylum law”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 9(1), 2007, 83–103.
104 C. Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, Oxford,
Blackwell, 2003, 37–41.
105 G. Noll, “Safeguard asylum”, in UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugee 2006: Human Displacement in the
New Millennium, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 38–9.
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mixed and nuanced result: circular migration and mixed flows are formally
accommodated as part of EU policy. Pilot regional camps have been attempted
in the Western CIS, North Africa, and East Africa. Mobility partnerships and
joint naval patrols under the aegis of Frontex or bilateral operations are com-
monplace in 2010. Integrated Border Technology stretches from the Western
Atlantic coast to Libya. A series of informal camps populate the landscape of the
Maghreb. Although the EU has increased its budget substantially for the
European Refugee Fund III, EASO, and the Fundamental Rights Agency,
which present a softer side to managed migration, far more funds are still
allocated for security and the general tone remains focused on the prevention,
detection, and discontinuation of as many migratory flows as possible.
Nevertheless, the European Commission’s Communication on the
Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme of 2 September 2009
may signal a new approach to the use of camps more in the spirit of the coun-
terfactual possibilities of the Kosovo crisis of 1999 discussed earlier in this article.
This Communication reminds the reader that the Green Paper on the Future of
the Common Asylum System (June 2007) already noted the difference between
resettlement of refugees from outside the EU and burden sharing from within
the EU. Present resettlement policies refer to the apportionment of UNHCR
offshore refugees, but the suggestion that EASO in Malta will facilitate this
transfer to those Member States who have volunteered to take part in this pro-
gramme (of which there are ten to date) might lead to more extensive burden
sharing within the EU.106 To be clear, EASO is not in place of a European
Refugee Agency that the EU requires for a proper system of burden sharing.
Rather, EASO is in the tradition of supranational intergovernmentalism and will
facilitate shared knowledge of countries of origin “to harmonize practices, pro-
cedures and decisions”. In other words, in the tradition of the open method of
coordination, the aim is to redefine “problems hitherto perceived (as) national
instead of common European problems”.107 The Justice and Home Affairs
Council on 18–19 June 2009 adopted in its conclusions the aim to resettle
10,000 Iraqi refugees in the EU; the Germans have recently accepted 2,500
additional Iraqi refugees. This is a sign of a nascent burden-sharing mechanism
coming into view because, as mentioned previously, the largest number of Iraqi
refugees in Europe and North America had previously ended up in Sweden due
to a generous unilateral national programme.108
Parallel to these developments was the creation of the Emergency Transit
Centre in Romania based in Timosoara. This was established through a tripartite
agreement in 2008 among the UNHCR-IOM, the Government of Romania,
106 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the establishment of a joint EU resettlement programme”, COM (2009) 447 Final, 2 Sept.
2009.
107 Pollak and Slominski, “Experimentalist”, op. cit. 913.
108 European Commission, “Joint resettlement programme”, op. cit.
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and a local NGO, which helped in its administration. Opened in early 2009, this
was a modest effort in which several hundred offshore/resettled refugees were
housed for up to 6 months for further resettlement within the EU or else-
where.109 However, the EU saw this as a pilot programme and thought it fit
well with the Communication of September 2009, and a new push on advancing
the harmonization of resettlement efforts through the offices of EASO. Under
ERF III (2008–13), Member States would receive 4,000 Euros for each refugee
resettled and the Commission instructed Member States to supply annual figures
for numbers resettled.
It is also instructive to see how the Romanian Government handled the
publicity surrounding the camp in Timosoara. Unlike the secret camps in Libya
or the pilot camps elsewhere in Africa and the Western CIS, or the sharp dis-
missive reactions of Croatia and Ukraine in 2003, Romania was proud of its
achievement, broadcasting it to demonstrate Romania’s embrace of global and
EU solidarity, to demonstrate that this recently admitted Member State was
adopting the embedded liberal political culture of Europe, that it was a respon-
sible and willing partner not only in migration management, as the Moroccans
had trumpeted, but in the ethical values of liberal hospitality.110 In this case the
camp was a liberal beacon not hidden from public view as a place of lawless
irresponsibility. And the Romanians explained how the occupants of the camp
had regular contact with the local inhabitants of Timosoara in which the local
participating NGO helped to foster the sympathies of the Romanian population.
The EU hoped that EASO and Romanian efforts would incite the spread of pilot
camps elsewhere in the EU and called on a marriage between these internal
camps and new generation of putative regional protection camps in North
Africa and the Middle East.111
Just as the Romanian pilot camp points to a far more humane form of camp
than those in Libya or the miserable informal camps in North Africa, so too the
concept of extraterritoriality can be used in an entirely different way in light of
the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon. The end of the pillar structure within the EU
means that the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament will have
far more power to enhance the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. With the
formal recognition of the European Convention of Human Rights and the
Refugee Convention, a new form of liberal extraterritoriality will come into
play, the long-term effects of which remain difficult to discern.112 Earlier, I
109 UHHCR-Government of Romania-IOM-OIM-EU, “The Emergency Transit Centre in Romania,”
9 Jul. 2009.
110 Ibid.
111 European Commission, “Joint resettlement programme”, op. cit.
112 For discussions of the Treaty of Lisbon and its possible effects, see R. Crowe, “The Treaty of Lisbon: A
revised legal framework for the organization and function of the European Union”, ERA Forum, 9, 2008,
163–208; S. Peers, “Legislative update: EU immigration and asylum competence and decision-making in
the Treaty of Lisbon”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10(2), 2008, 219–47; S. Kessler, “The Lisbon
Treaty and the European asylum and migration policies”, Information Note 4, Brussels, Jesuit Refugee
Service-Europe, Nov. 2009; C. Reh, “The Lisbon Treaty: De-constitutionalizing the European Union?,
Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(1), 2009, 625–50.
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suggested that Member States seem to be merging towards a common under-
standing of citizenship based on a modified form of jus sanguinis. But the supra-
national EU is a community of law, not one based on common ancestry,
ethnicity, or fate, and it is a community of law in which law has an extraterri-
torial effect.113 European primary and secondary law oblige European
border-control bodies to uphold non-refoulement. Agencies such as Frontex
will be under the review of the European Court of Justice and naval push-backs
by Member States may also be judged illegal by the Court. There seems to be
growing consensus amongst European jurists that the US Supreme Court’s
ruling on Caribbean interdictions was given on very shaky legal grounds; the
message heard is that EU Member States cannot escape their legal obligations in
extraterritorial space.114 And the European Court of Justice has begun to rule on
asylum and refugee law in the Member States with Greece and Denmark losing
cases for failing to enforce asylum directives. The Court also reversed a Dutch
decision to refuse protection of an Iraqi asylum-seeker in February 2009.115
Thus, we can see the development of countervailing powers within the legal
space of the EU, with legal and supranational mechanisms countering avoidance
strategies, which rely on extraterritorialization. Indeed, the European
Commission has anticipated this legal clash, by stating that the Joint
Curriculum of the Schengen Border Code for border guards and Frontex per-
sonnel include a section on the obligations to enforce the EU’s obligations under
international refugee and asylum law. Meanwhile, various agencies which have
prioritized security policy are being potentially countered by others, such as the
Fundamental Rights Agency. Embedded liberalism is flexible and contingent,
realism does enter, and it is certainly true that pragmatic arguments are necessary
to ensure that international obligations are enforced.
Nevertheless, the rule of law is no mere ruse. Prophecies of the rule of an
exceptional regime or critics of human rights rhetoric (be they conservative or
post-modernist) may be too hasty; even if Marie-Be´ne´dicte Dembour’s
Nietzschean take on human rights, or “human rights nihilism”, argues that
human rights are an artificial creation, an ideal type, and open to abuse by
interested powers; nevertheless, she also concludes they must be cherished,
they are strategically necessary even if one should be sceptical of special pleading
and the inverted usages by Member States who use human rights to achieve the
reverse.116 Thus, while the “obscurity of legal reasoning or institutionalized
113 This does not mean that the political and sociological factors comprising the EU’s migration regime will
mitigate this outcome. As Parsons and Smeeding remind us, the EU’s “combination of ‘nativist’ national
identities, established minorities, and quasi-federal government make political solutions particularly diffi-
cult to elaborate”. See C. A. Parsons and T. M. Smeeding, “What’s unique about immigration in Europe?”,
in Parsons and Smeeding, “Immigration”, op. cit. 26–7.
114 A. Fischer-Lescano, T. Lo¨hr and T. Tohidpur, “Border controls at sea: Requirements under international
humans rights and refugee law”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 21(2), 2009, 256–96.
115 Collett, “Beyond Stockholm”, op. cit. 45–6.
116 M.-B. Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2006, 26, 142, 180, 274–5.
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rights language”,117 as has been recently argued, may mask the power struggles,
national priorities, and ideological influences behind the formation of the CEAS,
human rights, even human rights without illusions, are important to understand
the motivations behind EU policy-making and the unintended outcomes of the
politics of the exceptional. It is impossible to understand the dynamics behind
the Geneva regime in the EU without accepting that, even if it honoured in the
breach, burden sharing, non-refoulement, and sanctity of international law remain
shared aspirations.
If we return to Giorgio Agamben, behind him we find Carl Schmitt and his
fashionable ideas that identifying an enemy and fear are the motivating forces of
politics, but, with these first premises, a despotic mentality is the natural out-
come. However, as Jef Huysmans has shown, a social democratic concept of the
exceptional was posited against Schmitt’s bargain in Weimar Germany by other
democratic jurists.118 Thus a form of social solidarity, a legal space founded on
fundamental freedoms and welfare rights, a pragmatic humanitarianism, is the
best way to promote human rather than “homeland security”.119
117 J. Pirjola, “European asylum policy-inclusions and exclusions under the surface of universal human rights
languages”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11(4), 2009, 347.
118 J. Huysmans, “Minding exceptions: The politics of insecurity and liberal democracy”, Contemporary Political
Theory, 3(3), 2004, 321–41.
119 Although the concept of human security may be a useful rhetorical flourish it may be problematic for
asylum and refugee policy. See A. Hammerstad, “The Securitzation of Forced Migration and its Impact on
the International Refugee Regime”, ISA, 50th Annual Convention, New York, 16 Feb. 2009.
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